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While the widely studied allocentric spatial representation holds a special status in
neuroscience research, its exact nature and neural underpinnings continue to be the
topic of debate, particularly in humans. Here, based on a review of human behavioral
research, we argue that allocentric representations do not provide the kind of map-like,
metric representation one might expect based on past theoretical work. Instead, we
suggest that almost all tasks used in past studies involve a combination of egocentric
and allocentric representation, complicating both the investigation of the cognitive basis
of an allocentric representation and the task of identifying a brain region specifically
dedicated to it. Indeed, as we discuss in detail, past studies suggest numerous brain
regions important to allocentric spatial memory in addition to the hippocampus, including
parahippocampal, retrosplenial, and prefrontal cortices. We thus argue that although
allocentric computations will often require the hippocampus, particularly those involving
extracting details across temporally specific routes, the hippocampus is not necessary for
all allocentric computations. We instead suggest that a non-aggregate network process
involving multiple interacting brain areas, including hippocampus and extra-hippocampal
areas such as parahippocampal, retrosplenial, prefrontal, and parietal cortices, better
characterizes the neural basis of spatial representation during navigation. According to this
model, an allocentric representation does not emerge from the computations of a single
brain region (i.e., hippocampus) nor is it readily decomposable into additive computations
performed by separate brain regions. Instead, an allocentric representation emerges from
computations partially shared across numerous interacting brain regions. We discuss our
non-aggregate network model in light of existing data and provide several key predictions
for future experiments.
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Central to considering how we represent our spatial surround-
ing, Edward Tolman (1948) first proposed that the brain creates
a “cognitive map” of a spatial environment. Based on his work
primarily in rodents, Tolman linked a specific cognitive map to
a certain spatial environment (analogous to a cartographic map)
such that the position of an object within that environment could
be derived fromreference to at least twoother landmarks. This per-
spective argued against the idea that a rodent’s representation of
the surrounding environment was based solely on self-referenced
(egocentric) sequences of turns, demonstrating that the internal
representation of space must be more integrated and compre-
hensive than previously assumed by behaviorist researchers. Since
Tolman, the idea that most species, including humans, posses
multiple mechanisms for navigating, including one dependent on
information about the position of the self relative to the envi-
ronment (egocentric) and another regarding the position of other
objects position relative to each other in the environment (allocen-
tric), is generally well accepted, with some caveats we will discuss.
In contrast, the exact nature of these representations, when and in
what manner the two representational systemsmanifest and inter-
act, and what brain areas are critical for them, particularly in
humans, remains less clear. Thus, the first primary challenge we
will consider is exactly how and in what manner an allocentric
representation manifests during behavior and to what extent it
operates exclusively, or most often, in the presence of egocentric
representation.
Subsequent research has often focused on one specific brain
area inparticular, thehippocampus, inhousing theneuralmachin-
ery underlying the cognitive map. While there is overall broad
consensus regarding the involvement of the hippocampus in allo-
centric memory, there is significantly less consensus across both
empirical and theoretical studies, particularly in humans, regard-
ing the primary (i.e., necessary) role of the hippocampus to all
forms of allocentric memory. Here, we will explore some reasons
why pinning down a primary role for the human hippocam-
pus in allocentric memory across studies has been challenging,
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including both the difficulty of identifying “process-pure” allo-
centric tasks and the fact that multiple brain regions contribute
necessary functions to allocentric memory. We then attempt to
define a network-based model of spatial navigation addressing
some of these potential short-comings.
DEFINING AND MEASURING ALLOCENTRIC MEMORY IN
HUMANS: APPROACHES AND CHALLENGES
Before we begin our discussion, it is helpful to define and clar-
ify some of the basic assumptions and ideas we will be working
with throughout. We use the term “navigation” as a proxy for the
processing of a variety of different forms of information during
self-movement that may lead to different cognitive strategies use-
ful for ultimately finding our way to a given destination. This
information is most often visual but also vestibular, proprio-
ceptive, somatosensory, and auditory. Although humans have a
bias toward using visual information, the others are often pro-
cessed as well, and they may all contribute (either in a combined
fashion or independently) to extracting information about the
environment (e.g., its shape and scale), the location of items,
and our own location within it. While navigating, we become
familiar with the environment and acquire knowledge about it,
thereby extracting information from it and storing this informa-
tion in our memory so that we can recall it later for a variety
of purposes. The process of extracting information from our
environment can be quite rapid, particularly if we can view
useful features, like landmarks, by scanning the environment
(Ishikawa and Montello, 2006; Wolbers and Wiener, 2014); it
can also take time, depending on the size of the environment
(Siegel and White, 1975). One form of such information that we
(often) begin extracting and storing is a mental representation
of where things are in space with respect to each other inde-
pendent of our own location (i.e., an allocentric representation;
often termed a “cognitive map” due to its similarity to a carto-
graphic map that is used in unfamiliar surroundings to access
such information).
The use of an allocentric representation will most often be pro-
nounced at decisions points, and in particular, when we make
judgments about the relative position of objects based on our
memory of the location where they have previously been encoun-
tered. For example, when arriving at a landmark, or viewing it
from a certain distance, we could remember that our destination
is positionedbetween this landmark and another one, sitting about
2/3 of the way from the 2nd landmark and at a 30◦ angle from the
first one. Such decisions on where things are in space with respect
to one another and the actual location of the individual, however,
do not necessarily depend on an allocentric representation. For
example, we could also remember, based on our past experience,
that our goal is present 50 and 30◦ to the right of our current
position, which would be an egocentric form of spatial judgment
(Figures 1A,B; see also Wolbers and Wiener, 2014). Therefore,
a mental representation of the environment can involve either
allocentric or egocentric spatial representations, or most com-
monly, both. Whatever representation we use at decision points,
however, we must be able to eventually represent the environ-
ment relative to our immediate position in space in order to
select an appropriate route, make the correct turns, and travel
the correct distance to our goal. Thus, for our purposes here, we
consider navigation as a process that will most often involve a
primarily egocentric form of representation as it depends, first
and foremost, on orientation and locomotion of the individual in
space.
As alluded to earlier, early research tied the idea of an allocentric
representation closely to a cognitive map, which was postulated to
posses many of the same qualities as a cartographic map (Tolman,
1948; O’Keefe and Nadel, 1978; Gallistel, 1990). This extended
the conceptualization of an allocentric representation to the idea
that these representations also involve some of the metric proper-
ties of cartographic maps themselves. Critically, this includes the
idea that cognitive maps involve a fundamental Euclidean metric
framework (O’Keefe and Nadel, 1978; Gallistel, 1990), suggesting
that objects are accurately represented both according to their dis-
tance and angular relationships, akin to how they are in the real
world (O’Keefe and Nadel, 1978). Subsequent work in humans,
though, has generally not supported the idea that situations involv-
ing utilization of an allocentric representation possess the same
characteristics as cartographic maps, particularly their Euclidean
qualities (for a review, see: Tversky, 1992). For example, prior
heuristic knowledge (Stevens and Coupe, 1978), experience with
specific egocentric viewpoints (Shelton and McNamara, 2001),
and geometrically prominent features (McNamara et al., 2003;
Cheng and Newcombe, 2005) influence how these representations
manifest.
In one widely cited and discussed example of our spatial rep-
resentations differ from cartographic maps, Stevens and Coupe
(1978) asked participants to indicate which cities from a list
were further west. Although participants made many of these
judgments correctly, one particular error occurred for decisions
involving Reno and San Diego (Reno is further west due to the
geography of the U.S.). Participants consistently indicated that
San Diego was further west, suggesting that category heuristics
(that California is furtherwest thanNevada) overode actualmetric
Euclidean knowledge of maps. In another example of inaccuracies
in our metric knowledge of space, several studies have shown that
we systematically underestimate the Euclidean properties of spa-
tial geometries. In one such study, both blindfolded sighted and
blind participants were asked to complete a third leg of a triangle
by walking it after traversing the first two legs. Participants were
not very accurate at the task and often made direction and dis-
tance errors in their return path (Loomis et al., 1993; for a detailed
discussion, please see: Philbeck et al., 2001). While the triangle
completion task can be solved using a primarily egocentric updat-
ing strategy, which we will discuss in more detail shortly, others
have argued that path integration involves interaction with a cog-
nitivemap (Gallistel, 1990; McNaughton et al., 1991), thus relying,
in part, on allocentric coding. From this perspective, errors in the
triangle completion task indicate that our internal “map” of space
often does not mirror the metric properties of physical space.
Together, these findings demonstrate our spatial judgments are
subject to systematic distortions and errors, suggesting that our
cognitive map, at least with limited exposure, is not comparable
to an actual cartographic map.
Another factor that appears to influence how we utilize an allo-
centric representation is our experience with current and prior
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FIGURE 1 | (A) An example of an egocentric coding strategy. (B) An example
of an allocentric coding strategy. (C) How path integration can occur using a
predominantly egocentric coding scheme. (D) How navigation short-cuts can
occur using a predominantly egocentric (path integration) strategy. Note that
in (C) and (D) we have flipped the sign of the resultant vector, which would
equate to turning 180 degrees, but does not alter the vector quantity.
viewpoints (Sholl, 1987). In one of many examples of this, Sholl
(1987) tested participants on their knowledge of locations of cam-
pus buildings (see also: Werner and Schmidt, 1999; Frankenstein
et al., 2012). Participants were oriented in the room relative to
campus and told to point to campus landmarks. Participants were
significantly faster to identify campus landmarks located in front
of them vs. behind them. Thus, although participants had knowl-
edge of the relative position of landmarks on campus, pointing
accurately in most cases, there was a clear advantage for allocen-
tric information oriented with their current bearing. In a similar
vein, several studies have also suggested an advantage for retriev-
ing allocentric information consistent with the viewpoint from
which it was originally encoded. Specifically, if participants learn
an array of objects arranged in a room, they are significantly faster
and more accurate at retrieving their location in the absence of
the objects if their viewpoint is aligned with what they originally
experienced (relative to the axes in the room) compared to a mis-
aligned viewpoint (Diwadkar and McNamara, 1997). The same
orientation-dependent properties hold for judgments about infor-
mation learned from large scale environments (Roskos-Ewoldsen
et al., 1998), cartographic maps (Evans and Pezdek, 1980), and for
navigation in virtual environments (VE; Richardson et al., 1999).
Thus, for both allocentric spatial relationships learned by viewing
them or freely navigating, orientation biases how we store and
retrieve these representations.
Another form of navigation sometimes taken as an example of
allocentric representation is path integration (McNaughton et al.,
1991). Path integration is a situation in which a participant pro-
duces a novel path on having completed two (or more) other
components of the journey. One particularly well-known exam-
ple of path integration is when a gerbil pup is separated from its
mother. The mother will forage with a wandering path until she
finds her pup. Once the pup is found, however, shewill take a direct
route to get the pup back to safety in the nest (Mittelstaedt and
Mittelstaedt, 1980). In humans, path integration has frequently
been studied by having participants walk the first two legs of
a triangle and then determine the optimal path, or “short-cut,”
back to the origin. While on the surface it might seem that path
integration would necessitate map-like knowledge of the environ-
ment (Tolman, 1948; O’Keefe andNadel, 1978;McNaughton et al.,
1991), this is not always the case. As was subsequently pointed out
in later work, path integration can also be accomplished using an
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egocentric updating strategy (keeping track of one’s bearing and
distance and comparing with the bearing of the start position;
Wang and Spelke, 2002). As alluded to earlier, this can operate,
in principle, with no external landmarks, and thus no need for
allocentric representation (Figure 1C).
In practice though, at least in humans, path integration in envi-
ronments without landmarks involves substantial errors (Philbeck
et al., 1997; Foo et al., 2005) and eventual complete disorientation
at long enough distances, such as in the desert (Souman et al.,
2009). While path integration in humans is comparably more
accurate when ample landmarks are provided (Foo et al., 2005),
whether this involves additional allocentric computations based
on generalizing from egocentric position cues provided by the
landmark remains unclear. Thus, employing short-cuts and/or
using path integration strategies is not necessarily indicative of
using an allocentric strategy as it can be accomplished by employ-
ing primarily egocentric cues. In Figure 1D, we illustrate an
example of how short-cuts could potentially be solved using a
primarily egocentric form of representation. The importance of
landmarks to path integration, however, suggests it is not a purely
egocentric strategy either. To be clear, employing short-cuts does
not work necessarily at the exclusion of egocentric or allocentric
representation; for the reasons outlined above, it cannot be con-
sidered a purely, or even primarily, allocentric or egocentric task,
either.
A final issue we will mention here is an important point regard-
ing the scale of navigational space considered in the task. As
elegantly pointed out in a recent review by Wolbers and Wiener
(2014), many tasks appearing to involve allocentric representa-
tion, such as the well-known Morris Water Maze (Morris et al.,
1982), also involve judgments in relatively small scale space, which
they term “vista space.” This suggests, though, that such tasks can
often be solved using information that can be captured with a
single viewpoint (see also: Yamamoto and Shelton, 2009). While
viewpoints can still involve use of either allocentric or egocentric
forms of representation, depending on whether or not there is
reference to external landmarks (Wolbers and Wiener, 2014), the
majority of control conditions involving the Morris Water don’t
involve a clear need for egocentric representation (representation
of the bearing of landmarks relative to oneself). Instead, they can
be based on simple visuo-motor strategies or viewpoint matching.
Even an allocentric representation in vista space, such as refer-
ence to two (or more) external landmarks, can involve a single
snapshot (Wolbers andWiener, 2014), which could in principle be
rotated by body repositioning to be solved egocentrically (Simons
andWang, 1998). Thus, in our discussion of allocentric represen-
tation, it is important to consider both the scale of space, as well
as the extent to which alternative egocentric strategies might per-
mit a solution to what otherwise appears as a primarily allocentric
task.
WHEN DON’T EGOCENTRIC AND ALLOCENTRIC
REPRESENTATIONS COEXIST AND INTERACT: HOW TO
DETERMINE THE PRESENCE OF EGOCENTRIC AND
ALLOCENTRIC REPRESENTATION
The above perspective necessitates an important question: to what
extent might one observe a process “pure” allocentric task? It has
been argued in some reviews that egocentric coding schemes dom-
inate in most human spatial memory studies, such that the only
cases in which one might observe an allocentric form of rep-
resentation is based on the geometry of the room (Wang and
Spelke, 2000, 2002). In one such study demonstrating the dom-
inance of egocentric viewpoints, the authors had participants
learn the locations of objects in a room. Participants were then
blindfolded and either slowly rotated or rotated quickly to induce
disorientation. While knowledge of the positions of objects in
the room remained high when participants remained oriented,
disorientation resulted in almost complete loss of knowledge of
locations of objects in the room. Even following disorientation,
however, participants could accurately point to corners of the
room (particularly in terms of their relative locations). These find-
ings argued that in the absence of orienting cues, which strongly
influence egocentric representation, our knowledge of allocen-
tric relationships drop precipitously, with the exception of the
boundaries defined by the room (but see: Holmes and Sholl,
2005).
There are two important points, however, about the Wang and
Spelke (2000) study. The first regards the measure that Wang and
Spelke used, which we term here the scene and orientation depen-
dent pointing (SOP) task. This task involves participants simply
pointing to objects based on their current location (i.e., point
to the computer monitor, Figure 2A), either when blindfolded
or with the targets removed. A subsequent study by Waller and
Hodgson (2006), using a similar paradigm to Wang and Spelke,
in contrast, showed that during judgments of relative direction
(JRD), which involved reference to external landmarks, pointing
accuracy actually improved following disorientation while SOP
accuracy dropped (Waller and Hodgson, 2006). In the JRD point-
ing task, participants made reference to least two other objects
when pointing to a third (e.g., imagine you are standing at the
flower pot, facing the jar, now point to the coffee mug; see
Figure 2B). Thus, when asking participants to respond using
the relative positions of objects within the environment, pointing
accuracy actually improved. This double dissociation suggested
that part of what may happen to disoriented participants is that
when asked to rely on a task involving their current orientation
(like the SOP task), they are unable to access any allocentric
knowledge. In contrast, when solving a task like the JRD task,
which explicitly asks participants to think in terms of spatial
relationships of recently learned objects, they employ a more
allocentric-based strategy (Burgess, 2006). Thus, these data in fact
suggest that participants can utilize allocentric knowledge, but
when and how they do so depends to some extent on how they are
queried.
The second issue involves the testing set-up used in the Wang
and Spelke (2000) study. It is notable that many studies of human
spatial memory involve learning arrays of objects in relatively
small-sized, regularly shaped rooms over a single trial of learn-
ing. As pointed out above, though, if we consider larger scale
space (termed by Wolbers and Wiener “environmental space”)
rather than vista space, utilization of an allocentric representa-
tion might be more obvious since viewpoints cannot readily be
used to solve the task. In these situations, however, given the
complexity of the environment to be learned, it may take several
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FIGURE 2 | (A)The scene and orientation-dependent pointing (SOP) task,
often employed to assay an egocentric representation. (B)The judgments
of relative direction (JRD) task, often used to assay an allocentric
representation. (C) Spectrum of involvement of egocentric and allocentric
representation during the SOP and JRD tasks. (D) Different models in the
literature of how egocentric and allocentric representations may be coded.
trials for different forms of spatial knowledge to manifest. In one
such study in which we addressed this issue, participants learned
large virtual spatial layouts (∼300 squaremeters) either by directly
navigating it or learning it from a map. Testing a total of five
blocks of navigation and map learning interspersed with either
the SOP or JRD task, we found differential improvements in SOP
and JRD pointing accuracy depending on whether participants
learned the environment froma route or cartographicmap. Specif-
ically, map learning resulted in the fastest improvements in JRD
pointing accuracy while route learning resulted in the fastest gains
in SOP pointing accuracy. Importantly, map learning resulted in
fast, non-linear improvements in JRD pointing accuracy com-
pared to route learning (Zhang et al., 2014). Together, these data
suggest that while both learningmodalities affect putative egocen-
tric (measured via the SOP task) and allocentric (measured via
the JRD) knowledge, route learning provides preferential access
to egocentric knowledge and map learning provides preferential
access to allocentric knowledge. Our study also suggests, how-
ever, that both egocentric and allocentric forms of representations
are typically involved in spatial learning, consistent with previ-
ous behavioral studies in humans (Mou et al., 2004; Waller and
Hodgson, 2006).
An important caveat, however, which is generally recognized in
the human spatial cognition literature and we alluded to in our
definitions section, is exactly how to measure egocentric and allo-
centric forms of representation in the first place. For example, the
SOP task involves participants pointing to unseen targets based
on their current orientation. This does not preclude, however,
that participants also utilize some form of allocentric knowl-
edge. Specifically, participants could easily picture their current
position on a map and point to objects based on their knowl-
edge of their position relative to other positions of objects in
an environment, treating themselves no differently than other
objects in the environment. While the SOP task certainly does
not preclude employing allocentric knowledge of objects in the
environment, however, the fact that pointing accuracy falls so
drastically during disorientation (Wang and Spelke, 2000; Waller
and Hodgson, 2006) seems to argue against this idea some-
what. By the same token, when participants perform the JRD
pointing task, which involves imaging oneself at a position in
the environment, they must first orient themselves within the
environment, which would seem to utilize some degree of ego-
centric positioning information. While the use of orientation
cues can be mitigated somewhat by having participants picture
novel (rather than familiar) positions and orientations in the
environment, it is clear that orientation provides some bene-
fit in the task. At the same time, without some knowledge of
the spatial relationships between objects in the environment, it
seems unlikely that participants could solve the task using only
orientation cues. In Figure 2C, we outline the extent to which
egocentric and allocentric representation might, in theory, over-
lap with the SOP and JRD tasks. As is notable in Figure 2C,
we suggest a large area of overlap between the two tasks, with
some areas of non-overlap. This indicates that while both tasks
involve some form of the two representations, each will involve
some predominance of egocentric and allocentric representation,
respectively.
EGOCENTRIC TO ALLOCENTRIC CONVERSION AND VICE
VERSA: THE ABSENCE OF PURE FORMS OF EGOCENTRIC
AND ALLOCENTRIC REPRESENTATION
As pointed out in the above arguments and Figure 2C, even tasks
widely used in human spatial learning to assess egocentric and
allocentric knowledge likely do not tap into one form of repre-
sentation exclusively. In fact, most ethological situations would
appear to involve some combination of two forms of representa-
tions, with a spectrum of when the two might dominate perhaps
being the most accurate way to conceptualize how we represent
a spatial environment (Figure 2C). While the farthest end of this
spectrum might involve a “pure” form of allocentric representa-
tion, there is currently no clear situation in which a participant
might use an allocentric representation in the complete absence
of any egocentric representation. A “pure” allocentric representa-
tion might be expected to be present, at least cognitively, when
participants make judgments about the positions of landmarks
relative to each other (without reference to self-position). Because
this “pure” form of allocentric representation is hard to isolate
experimentally, it remains difficult to validate.
One interesting proposal that provides a possible solution to
the above problems regarding the relative absence of a “pure” allo-
centric representation is provided by the influential Byrne et al.
(2007) model of spatial learning (which we term the BBB model).
TheBBBmodel argues that almost all situations require translation
between egocentric and allocentric representation, suggesting that
most situations would likely involve a mixture of the two forms
of representation (Figure 2D, “interacting model”). The crux of
the model argues that egocentric representations are primarily
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housed in parietal cortex, representing information of one’s cur-
rent viewpoint based on one’s current position and bearing (Byrne
et al., 2007). Allocentric representations are housed in the medial
temporal lobe (MTL) and involve place cells, neurons that code
specific spatial locations and thus provide some degree of met-
ric knowledge about locations in the environment (O’Keefe and
Dostrovsky, 1971). Finally, retrosplenial cortex, a brain area that
sends and receives projections from parietal cortex and sends and
receives projections to the MTL, performs translation between
egocentric and allocentric coordinate frames. In the model, this
involves aligning the current “map” in the MTL with one’s current
viewpoint such that a view specific map is computed in retros-
plenial cortex. This would be akin to a map that is aligned based
on our current bearing, so if we are facing east, it would be like
orienting the map eastward. In addition to the neuroanatomical
considerations we will consider shortly, this model thus pro-
vides an explanation of why most situations would preclude us
from observing “pure” allocentric representations, as retrosplenial
cortex would frequently “align” whatever map-like knowledge we
have with our current bearing. Thus, the model makes the impor-
tant prediction that in most situations, neither pure egocentric
nor allocentric knowledge will necessarily be at play because some
degree of conversion between the two forms of representation will
occur during navigation.
An important alternative we might consider here is the idea
that there is no single egocentric or allocentric representation
but instead that all forms of representation involve essentially a
hybrid between the two (Sheth and Shimojo, 2004). This counter
point thus would argue (1) egocentric to allocentric represen-
tation is unnecessary because the two representations are really
one “combined” representation (Figure 2D), (2) brain damage
is unlikely to selectively disable either form of representation
because both are present in multiple brain systems, and (3) brain
imaging will likely fail to identify one region clearly associated
with either form of representation, or conversion process, instead
showing that both forms of representation involve a mixture of
brain areas. This argument is weakened, however, by the fact that
lesion and neuroimaging studies suggest some distinct regions
participate in tasks involving primarily egocentric vs. allocen-
tric strategies, as we will explore in more detail shortly. The
behavioral double dissociations reported by Waller and Hodg-
son and Zhang et al. (2014) for SOP and JRD pointing tasks also
argues against this model (Waller and Hodgson, 2006; Zhang
et al., 2014). To be clear, though, showing that one region is
more involved in one form of representation than another does
not preclude the fact that the other representation is also partly
at play (nor does a behavioral double dissociation necessarily
exclude this possibility). It only suggests that in many situa-
tions, either a primarily allocentric or egocentric strategy is the
preferred or simpler way to solve the task, leaving behavior com-
paratively impaired when relying on the other representational
system.
A final point, which we will consider in more detail shortly, is
that even if we could identify a process-pure allocentric task, no
single brain region serves as the primary neural underpinning for
what manifests in behavior as use of an allocentric strategy. This
argument is more complex and essentially involves the idea that
(some) higher cognitive functions cannot readily be decomposed
into the contributions of a single brain region. Thus, it might be
that employing an allocentric strategy to solve a task, which we
infer involves an allocentric representation, recruits a network of
different brain regions, with no single process or brain region con-
tributing a unique, separable process in the form of an allocentric
representation. This account would still allow for the idea that
lesions to brain “hubs”within this network would be disruptive to
solving a task allocentrically but would not require that a single
brain region is necessary for all forms of tasks involving an allo-
centric navigation strategy.We will explore this argument in more
detail shortly.
BRAIN IMAGING AND LESION STUDIES: THE NEURAL BASIS
OF ALLOCENTRIC REPRESENTATION
As we have argued so far, different tasks likely involve different
mixtures of egocentric and allocentric representation. In fact, indi-
viduals may differ even in the extent to which they employ one
form of representation over another while navigating (Marchette
et al., 2011).We believe that thesemay be possible reasonswhy past
literature has been ambiguous, particularly in humans, regard-
ing the neural basis of allocentric representation. Nonetheless, we
should make clear, before talking about some of the inconsistent
findings in the literature, that many studies have in fact attributed
a primary role to the hippocampus in allocentric memory. For
example, a classic study from the rodent literature, which has
been replicated numerous times (for a review, see: D’Hooge and
De Deyn, 2001), showed that lesions to the rat hippocampus
impaired its ability to use distal cues to find the goal in the Morris
Water Maze (Morris et al., 1982). Specifically, lesions to the rat
hippocampus impaired its ability to find a hidden platform over
learning trials and its ability to recall its location on subsequent
“probe trials.” These same lesions did not affect the ability of the
rodent to find the hidden platform if a brightly colored cue is
placed above it (termed a “proximal cue.”) These findings have
often been taken to support a fundamental role for the rodent
hippocampus in map-based, allocentric-based navigation but not
egocentric-based navigation (e.g., Nadel, 1991). Studies involving
human patients with lesions restricted to the hippocampus show
similar impairments on virtual and real versions of the Morris
Water Maze, suggesting that performance of this task relies on the
hippocampus in both rats and humans (Astur et al., 2002; Bartsch
et al., 2010; Goodrich-Hunsaker et al., 2010; Banta-Lavenex et al.,
2014).
We have already discussed some of the possible limitations
with considering the Morris Water Maze as the gold standard
of allocentric representation, specifically relating to the fact that
the task can be solved based on manipulating a single viewpoint
(Wolbers and Wiener, 2014). Furthermore, some studies have
demonstrated instances in which rats with hippocampal damage
can solve the MorrisWater Maze. Perhaps the clearest examples of
these involve rats that receive extensive pre-training on complex
environments; following a hippocampal lesion, these rats are rela-
tively unimpaired at navigating the Morris Water Maze (Winocur
et al., 2005, 2010). Similar findings have also been reported from
humans with hippocampal lesions, who appear to have largely
intact allocentric memory for spatial layouts experienced decades
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prior to their brain injury (Teng and Squire, 1999; Rosenbaum
et al., 2000).
Modifications to the MorrisWater Maze paradigm also suggest
situations in which allocentric memory may be preserved even at
short delays. Day et al. (1999) showed that by gradually decreasing
the size of the hidden platform in the Morris Water maze from a
very large one to a small one, rats without a hippocampus could
learn the location of the hidden platform. This finding suggests
that the hippocampus is not necessary for acquiring or expressing
allocentric knowledge in some cases. Pearce et al. (1998) used a
modified version of the MorrisWater Maze involving a local land-
mark; the hidden platform was placed within 20 cm of a local,
visible landmark. When Pearce et al. (1998) moved the hidden
platform to the opposite side of the local landmark, both groups
of rats searched where the platform was previously and had dif-
ficulty in finding the locations of the switched platform. While it
is possible this was due to using a heading strategy to solve the
task (i.e., locate the visible landmark and swim toward one of the
distal cues), it is also possible that rats with hippocampal lesions
used some combination of local and distal cues to guide their path
in the first place, thus resulting in a tendency to search in the
previous location, like control rats. Otherwise, if rats were sim-
ply swimming to the local cue and using a random search strategy,
onemight have expected that they would have found the new loca-
tion with relative ease. Note that because the rats approached the
local cue from different start locations, a purely egocentric strat-
egy (i.e., turn right at the local cue) would not work for finding
the distal cue once the rat swam to the local cue. Together, these
data suggest that there may be instances in which some forms of
allocentric representation may be intact in rats with hippocampal
lesions.
Evidence from humans also suggests that some forms of
allocentric spatial memory can develop independently of the
hippocampus, even at short delays. Numerous functional mag-
netic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies contrasting primarily
allocentric with egocentric forms of navigation report parahip-
pocampal cortex (PHC), rather than hippocampal, activation
(Aguirre et al., 1996; Aguirre and D’Esposito, 1997; Committeri
et al., 2004; Janzen and van Turennout, 2004; Rosenbaum et al.,
2004; Wolbers and Buchel, 2005; Zhang and Ekstrom, 2013). For
example, Aguirre et al. (1996) demonstrated greater PHC, but
not hippocampal activation, when participants learned a maze-
like VE and subsequently drew maps compared to a control task
in which they walked in a constrained path around a different
VE. Committeri et al. (2004) reported similar results for mak-
ing judgments about static spatial scenes with reference to other
landmarks vs. based on the observer’s viewpoint. While there are
issues to consider regarding the ability to target a relatively small
structure such as the hippocampus that is often prone to signal
distortion, signal loss, and intersubject mis-registration (Fried,
1998; Yassa and Stark, 2009; Ekstrom, 2010), some of these same
studies (Wolbers and Buchel, 2005; Zhang and Ekstrom, 2013)
noted hippocampal activation in other contrasts. This suggests
that the presence of PHC activation and absence of hippocam-
pal activation in the above fMRI studies using contrasts likely
to tap into allocentric processing were unlikely to have arisen
from imaging-related methodological issues alone. These findings
support the idea that the PHC may be involved in some situa-
tions involving allocentric computations when the hippocampus
is not.
Indeed, lesions to the PHC appear to impair some forms of
spatial navigation involving allocentric memory in situations in
which hippocampal lesions do not. Bohbot et al. (1998) tested
lesion patients on the invisible sensor task, a real-world analog
of the Morris Water Maze in which participants explored a room
searching for a hidden sensor on the floor (Bohbot et al., 1998).
Lesions were either primarily restricted to the hippocampus or
extended into the PHC. In the task, patients entered the room
from the opposite entrance on the first trial of retrieval, which
occurred immediately after encoding, and then from the same
entrance as during encoding 30 min later. Bohbot et al. (1998)
found that right PHC lesions impaired spatial learning but only
after a 30-min delay was implemented, whereas damage to the left
or right hippocampus, with relatively spared PHC, produced nor-
mal performance on both immediate and delay tasks. Consistent
with other lesion studies in the literature, the Bohbot et al. (1998)
study supports the idea that the PHC could be important for tasks
that might otherwise seem more readily solved using a primarily
allocentric strategy (Habib and Sirigu, 1987).
PARAHIPPOCAMPAL AND RETROSPLENIAL CORTEX AS LOCI
OF NEURAL MACHINERY IMPORTANT TO SPATIAL
REPRESENTATION AND NAVIGATION
As we discussed above, PHC lesions, in many instances, disrupt
the ability of patients to navigate to recently learned locations
(Bohbot et al., 1998; Barrash et al., 2000). Given our earlier dis-
cussion, however, regarding the fact that almost all ethological
conditions involve some mixture of egocentric and allocentric
strategy, it seems reasonable to consider that the patients in
the Bohbot et al. (1998) study may have employed an egocen-
tric strategy. While patients did enter from the same door during
retrieval after the 30 minute delay in the study, which may have
permitted use of a strategy involvingmatching of viewpoints, sub-
sequent analysis of the path taken by the participants suggests
they were not simply matching their previously stored viewpoint
with their navigational trajectory (Bohbot et al., 2002). If they
were, we would have expected that participants would have nav-
igated directly to the goal from the door. It is possible, however,
that patients with hippocampal lesions may have employed a par-
tially egocentric strategy nonetheless, and based on our earlier
discussion, this idea is difficult to completely rule out without
follow-up experiments. As mentioned above, however, numerous
fMRI studies have shown activation in the PHC during retrieval
of spatial layout information. Indeed, one of the most highly
replicated studies in the fMRI of spatial processing is the fact
that the parts of posterior parahippocampal gyrus [termed the
parahippocampal place area (PPA)] respond particularly robustly
to scenes (Epstein and Kanwisher, 1998) and respond differently
to scenes from different viewpoints (Epstein et al., 2003). While
this has been taken by some researchers to support the idea that
the PHC is important for egocentric processing (Weniger et al.,
2010), other studies have suggested that areas of PHC show greater
degrees of activation when participants make judgments about
scenes based on reference to other objects in the scene rather
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than to themselves (Committeri et al., 2004; Zhang and Ekstrom,
2013).
Additional evidence supporting the role of PPA in spatial scene
processing comes from an analysis technique termed multivari-
ate voxel pattern analysis (MVPA). In this approach, patterns of
voxels are used to predict the stimulus that a participant viewed
(called the test set) based on a prior set of similar stimuli they
viewed (called the training set). This approach consistently indi-
cates that spatial scenes can be readily decoded from PPA and
retrosplenial cortex, although less readily from the hippocam-
pus (Diana et al., 2008; Liang et al., 2013; see also: Azab et al.,
2014). Thus, together, these results suggest that PHC shows a high
degree of sensitivity to the visual content of scenes compared to
the hippocampus.
Retrosplenial cortex also shows strong responses to spatial
scenes and spatial features, as measured with the fMRI blood oxy-
gen level-dependent (BOLD) signal (Epstein and Higgins, 2007;
Auger and Maguire, 2013; Zhang and Ekstrom, 2013). Further-
more, lesions to retrosplenial cortex significantly impair the ability
of participants to change their view perspective (Takahashi et al.,
1997). As proposed by Burgess et al. (2001), retrosplenial cor-
tex likely plays a role in combining head direction information
from anterior thalamic nuclei to with the current viewpoint and
stored scene representations, what can also be termed egocentric
to allocentric conversion. One of the first lines of evidence in
support of this idea came from Iaria et al. (2007), who demon-
strated engagement of retrosplenial cortex while individuals both
acquired knowledge of a new environment and when making use
of it to find a target location. Based on these findings, the authors
suggested that the role of the retrosplenial cortex may involve
both egocentric–allocentric conversion as well as an allocentric–
egocentric one. Several studies have additionally shown that the
BOLD signal in retrosplenial cortex is correlated with the amount
of allocentric knowledge acquired following learning the spa-
tial relations in an environment, suggesting its involvement in
extrapolating from largely egocentric-based route information to
allocentric-based maps (Wolbers and Buchel, 2005; Epstein et al.,
2007). Also, when participants make allocentric spatial judgments
following route learning, they show greater retrosplenial acti-
vation than following cartographic map learning (Zhang et al.,
2012). These data again support the idea that retrosplenial cortex
is involved in processes that place the observer in the large-scale
representation of the surrounding space by incorporating current
view with self-motion cues.
WHY ARE HIPPOCAMPAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO
ALLOCENTRIC MEMORY IMPORTANT?
One proposal to reconcile the conflicting findings on hippocampal
vs. PHC/retrosplenial contributions to allocentric spatial mem-
ory is that hippocampal contributions may be most evident when
spatial information must be held across different temporal inter-
vals (Poucet, 1993), a process termed spatiotemporal binding (e.g.,
Copara et al., 2014). Indeed,many situations that appear to involve
allocentric memory, such as remembering spatial locations and
integrating this information across multiple trials, would involve
just this. In contrast, when sufficient information is presented,
particularly across the same repeated trials, areas such as the PHC
can support allocentric memory (Moscovitch et al., 2005, 2006),
also termed “simple allocentric memory” (Burgess et al., 2002). In
support of this idea, Zhang and Ekstrom (2013) employed fMRI
in healthy participants while they learned the locations of stores
relative to a central landmark from an aerial view of a virtual city;
each store appeared on a different trial but always appeared with a
centrally located landmark. During fMRI acquisition, participants
navigated to a goal store starting from either the central landmark
or from one of the other stores. Navigating to the target store
using the central landmark resulted in PHC and retrosplenial acti-
vation, while employing one of the stores to infer the location of
another store, which had never before occurred on the same trial,
resulted in hippocampal activation. Similarly, Bohbot and Corkin
(2007) studied place learning in the patient HM, who had dam-
age to his anterior hippocampus but relatively intact posterior
parahippocampal gyrus, using the invisible sensor task. Results
showed that HM could navigate to the location of one of the hid-
den sensors quitewell, as inBohbot et al. (1998), butwhenmultiple
hidden sensors locationswere employed across trials, performance
fell to chance. These studies suggest that the PHC may sup-
port some forms of simple or “rigid” forms of allocentric spatial
memory (Burgess et al.,2002;Moscovitch et al.,2006)with thehip-
pocampus contributing in instances that require spatiotemporal
integration, such as remembering or inferring different locations
across trials.
ALLOCENTRIC REPRESENTATION AS A NETWORK
PHENOMENON RATHER THAN SPECIALIZED TO A SINGLE
BRAIN REGION
We have summarized two fundamental yet differing perspectives
so far regarding the neural basis of allocentric representation,
which are depicted in Figures 3A,B. The first perspective is that
an allocentric representation depends primarily on a single brain
region, with most past studies focusing on the hippocampus as
this structure. This perspective, based in large part on consid-
erations of MTL neuroanatomy, argues that the hippocampus
sits at the top of a processing pyramid and thus plays the pri-
mary role in allocentric representation (Lavenex andAmaral, 2000;
Banta-Lavenex et al., 2014); see Figure 3A. The primary pre-
diction from this model is that the hippocampus is necessary
for all forms of allocentric representation. A second perspec-
tive, articulated in various forms in the literature, is that the
hippocampus is one of several structures involved in spatial pro-
cessing but actively interacts with other structures to construct
an allocentric representation (Burgess et al., 2001; Byrne et al.,
2007; Galati et al., 2010; Chrastil, 2012); see Figure 3B. This
perspective suggests that the hippocampus is part of a network
of other brain areas involved in allocentric representation, with
each region adding a specific component to this process (Byrne
et al., 2007). As we have attempted to argue so far, we believe
that current data argue against the hierarchical model, provid-
ing stronger support for a network-based model. Although the
network-based model still depends primarily on the hippocam-
pus for allocentric representation, it suggests that other cortical
areas, such retrosplenial cortex, add important components to
this function, explaining why lesions to this area impair forms
of allocentric processing dependent on bearing (Takahashi et al.,
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FIGURE 3 | (A) Schematic of the hierarchical model. This model assumes
that the hippocampus sits at the top of a pyramid of allocentric
computations and is thus necessary for all forms of allocentric processing.
(B) A schematic of an aggregate network model of spatial cognition. This
model argues that that multiple brain regions interact during allocentric
representation, with each brain region adding a unique component, the
summation of which constitutes an allocentric representation. (C) A
schematic of the non-additive network model, in which multiple brain
regions support allocentric representation. Note that other brain regions
and cognitive processes contribute in these models but for illustration
purposes, we have focused on three primary regions.
1997; Byrne et al., 2007). This model also elegantly accounts for
the fact that most ethological situations involve a combination of
egocentric and allocentric representation, precisely because retro-
splenial cortex converts between the two representations. Thus,
we believe that there is strong merit to what we term the additive
network perspective and key predictions of this model remain to
be tested.
A third perspective, which, to our knowledge, has not been
explicitly articulated in the literature before, is the idea that multi-
ple brain areas contribute in a non-additive fashion to allocentric
representation (Figure 3C). The core of this idea is that no one
brain region is specialized for allocentric representation and no
one brain structure contributes a specific, separable “cognitive”
component an allocentric representation. We note that this sit-
uation could occur if we think of an allocentric representation
itself as not decomposable into elemental entities (e.g., Fodor,
1983). This, in turn, could arise because, as we have argued earlier,
there are no clear situations in which we can measure a “pure”
allocentic representation. As many have pointed out, though, it
is reasonable to consider an allocentric representation as decom-
posable into landmark, direction, and distance information (e.g.,
Gallistel, 1990), and at least in this sense, an allocentric represen-
tation appears behaviorally decomposable. Instead what we are
arguing is that even if we can decompose an allocentric repre-
sentation into subcomponents, the brain areas involved in spatial
cognition do not individually represent this information uniquely
in a way that summates into an allocentric representation. We
should be clear that the aggregate network perspective may yet be
fully valid and requires further testing. It is useful, however, to con-
sider an alternative viewpoint, which necessitates first identifying
how allocentric information may come to be represented through
system dynamics.
As argued in past work, it is possible to consider the functional
outputs of a system along a spectrum, with one end represent-
ing aggregate (i.e., additive) functions and the other representing
emergent (i.e., non-decomposable) functions. Along with other
attempts to explain cognitive processes in terms of complex sys-
tems theory (Bassett and Gazzaniga, 2011), we propose that the
allocentric representation sits in the middle of this spectrum
and is an example of a complex neurocognitive process which
is decomposable into dynamical network properties, but also
non-additive in nature. An aggregate model would suggest that
each brain region has its own specialized cognitive function and
each brain regions “adds” this function separately to the behav-
ior generated through the dynamics of the system (Friston et al.,
1996; Friston and Price, 2011). This would predict that the allo-
centric representation might depend on a single brain region,
or unique components contributed by individual brain regions,
and thus lesions to specific brain regions should consistently and
unambiguously impair tasks involving any formof allocentric rep-
resentation. As argued by Bassett and Gazzaniga (2011), however,
attributing single cognitive functions to separate brain regions
and aggregating them together may underestimate the dynami-
cal processes at play in the brain. A non-additive model would
involve integration of processes across spatially and temporally
distributed brain networks, which we believe could better cap-
ture precisely how the emergence of an allocentric representation
during behavior is coupled to neural processes. According to the
non-additive account, then, no single brain region contributes
to either egocentric or allocentric representation independently
and thus allocentric representation is a non-additive, dynamic
property generated though interactions between multiple brain
regions.
Although this is a new and emerging idea within the literature,
andmore evidence is needed to validate this perspective,we believe
that the difficulties in pinning down a single brain region underly-
ing allocentric representation, and its dynamic nature across tasks,
supports this perspective. One early study supporting this per-
spective, although it did not use connectivity or network analyses
specifically, was a study by Spiers andMaguire (2006). The authors
examined taxi-drivers as they planned routes to novel destina-
tions in a virtual version of London (Spiers and Maguire, 2006).
During route planning, which one might expect to involve some
allocentric computations (as well as egocentric ones), the authors
found activation in a number of spatially distributed brain regions,
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including hippocampus, retrosplenial cortex, and prefrontal cor-
tex (PFC). Also in support of the idea that multiple brain regions
code information relevant to allocentric coding, Sulpizio et al.
(2014) recently showed that position, direction, anddistance could
be decoded from hippocampus, PHC, and retrosplenial cortex in
participants freely navigating. These findings suggest that utilizing
an allocentric representation, which would be expected, in part,
when executing ormentally planning a route to a location, recruits
a network of different brain areas and may not be decompos-
able into the contributions of a single brain region or behavioral
process.
Similarly, a study by Watrous et al. (2013) used functional
connectivity, measured with oscillatory coherence and graph the-
ory, to characterize network dynamics during retrieving spatial
information about the relative distance between environmental
landmarks. Watrous et al. (2013) found that frequency specific
(1–4 Hz) increases in pairwise phase consistency correlated with
retrieval accuracy within a network distributed across the PFC,
MTL, and parietal cortex. In contrast, correct retrieval of tempo-
ral information about the task correlatedwith increased functional
connectivity in a different frequency band (7–10 Hz) within a
similar network (Watrous et al., 2013). In a separate study using
fMRI, Schedlbauer et al. (2014) showed that greater connectivity
to multiple brain “hubs” including the hippocampus correlated
with overall better participant spatiotemporal memory. Together,
these findings suggested that the integrative dynamics of the spa-
tially distributednetwork, rather than the activity of a single region
alone, was critical for accurate recall. In another study, the capac-
ity of a similarly distributed network to integrate information was
regressed against accuracy in using allocentric information to ori-
ent within a virtual city (Arnold et al., 2014). The authors found
that the global efficiency [i.e., a graph theoretical index of inte-
grative capacity, see Bullmore and Sporns (2009)] in resting-state
fMRI data was highly predictive of accurate orientation and that
some regions previously associated with allocentric orientation
(e.g., hippocampus) were more central within the networks of
accurate participants. This suggests that the topological compo-
sition of functional networks measured at rest may constrain the
degree to which separate brain regions exhibit coherence and inte-
grate information during recollection tasks. Considered together,
these findings support the perspective that the degree to which a
spatially distributed memory network is able to rapidly exchange
information is critical for the effectiveness of its functional out-
put. Importantly, each of these studies identified regions, such
as the MTL, that showed increased centrality within the mem-
ory network correlating with accurate recall. Thus, due to its
centrality within the network of brain areas important to spatial
navigation, the MTL specifically may often be identified in fMRI
studies attempting to localize brain activity during navigation
tasks.
The idea that multiple regions of the brain may interact during
spatial representation, with no one area contributing exclusively
to allocentric representation, offers a partial reconciliation for
seemingly contrasting neuropsychological reports attempting to
localize egocentric and allocentric representations to a specific
brain region. Specifically, as argued in past reports, networks
with similar connectivity and configurations as the brain [termed
degenerate networks, see Tononi et al. (1999)] are generally robust
to the removal of a single or even random sets of nodes (Albert
et al., 2000; Sporns et al., 2004). These data suggest that in some
cases the cognitive and behavioral output of a network can
be preserved through functional reorganization (Protzner and
McAndrews, 2011). In the case of egocentric and allocentric rep-
resentations, a navigational system in the brain that can dually
process both types of representations could theoretically adjust
its topological configuration to emphasize processing occurring
in preserved cortical regions through increasing their centrality
within the functional network active during navigation. This, in
turn, might explain why many navigational situations typically
involve a dynamic interplay between egocentric and allocentric
representations (Byrne et al., 2007; Zhang et al., 2014) rather than
the exclusive presence of one or the other.
THE NETWORK BASIS OF ALLOCENTRIC REPRESENTATION:
PREDICTIONS AND LIMITATIONS
It is important that the development of new theoretical mod-
els generates directly testable predictions that are falsifiable. We
believe that the network perspective, combined with multivari-
ate analytical techniques such as graph theoretical analysis, allow
numerous new predictions on the neurocognitive basis of allo-
centric representation. This may in turn allow some resolution
of discrepant findings in past studies and make progress toward
understanding such a complex phenomenon. Described below are
what we believe to be the most directly applicable, given the large
amount of behavioral, neuropsychological, andbrain imagingdata
already available to researchers.
First, if an allocentric representation is indeed primarily depen-
dent on the processing of a distributed network, rather than a
single brain region, it is reasonable to assume that lesions affecting
the dynamics of this network will impact a person’s ability to solve
a spatial task using allocentric information. Although most lesion
studies on allocentric representation focus on localized lesions
to the hippocampus, as noted above, there is now considerable
evidence suggesting both that non-hippocampal lesions can pro-
duce allocentric deficits (Habib and Sirigu, 1987; Takahashi et al.,
1997; Bohbot et al., 1998; Aguirre and D’Esposito, 1999; Barrash
et al., 2000). At the same time, hippocampal lesions often leave
some forms of allocentric processing intact (Bohbot et al., 1998;
Day et al., 1999; Teng and Squire, 1999; Rosenbaum et al., 2000;
Winocur et al., 2005; Bohbot and Corkin, 2007; Winocur et al.,
2010). Critically, the network perspective articulated here predicts
that the extent to which a lesion disrupts a spatial task involv-
ing allocentric processing is dependent upon its impact on the
dynamics of the network rather than the removal of a cognitive
process generated from the lesioned region (which would be pre-
dicted from an aggregate model of brain function). This suggests
that lesions in multiple brain regions may influence allocentric
processing because numerous spatially distributed regions are co-
active during allocentric retrieval tasks (Watrous et al., 2013). This
prediction is testable by investigating the effect a lesion has on
the topology of the functional network used for allocentric rep-
resentation, which can be determined using graph theoretical
measures quantifying the processing efficiency of the network,
as well as dynamic changes in the centrality of different nodes
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participating in the network following a lesion. Importantly, this
leads to a second prediction that navigational ability may be pre-
served in the case of certain brain lesions given an appropriate
rehabilitative context to adjust the types of representations that
patients are using to solve navigational tasks (i.e., Caglio et al.,
2012). It also supports the perspective that there may not be
purely egocentric or allocentric tasks per se, as recruitment of a
representation type likely isn’t a binary process (i.e., it’s either
engaged or not), but rather a question of the relative utility of
egocentric and allocentric representations to solve spatial ques-
tions about an environment. Preserved allocentric processing
may also occur through endogenous network reorganization that
shifts the topological configuration of task active functional net-
works engaged during allocentric spatial tasks to utilize residual
functional mechanisms.
Thus, it is reasonable to predict, based on the idea that if net-
work interactions support allocentric representation, conditions
associated with the disruption of functional interactions between
brain regions may result in deficits in allocentric processing.
Recent support for this idea comes from a study on develop-
mental topographical disorientation (DTD), a lifelong cognitive
disorder characterized primarily by an inability to encode large
scale environmental layouts (Iaria et al., 2009; Iaria and Bar-
ton, 2010). In the first group study on the neural basis of
DTD, Iaria et al. (2014) found that DTD was associated with
aberrant functional connectivity between the right hippocam-
pus and areas within medial and dorsal PFC. These decreases
in functional connectivity were apparent without any volumet-
ric differences in brain structure (particularly the hippocampus).
These findings suggested that DTD results from a diminished
capacity for MTL–PFC functional interactions, which in turn
produced the observed deficits in spatial processing and allo-
centric representation. Although more work needs to be done
to describe the neural basis of DTD, these initial results suggest
that deficits in allocentric processing may result from changes
in how brain regions interact and integrate to form functional
networks rather than the computations of one specific brain
region.
A second central prediction from this model is that allocen-
tric representation necessitates network interactions rather than
the activity of a single brain region. This prediction shifts the
explanatory emphasis from how a brain region produces a cog-
nitive function toward its role within a network that ultimately
results in the cognitive function under investigation. For example,
as pointed out previously, if task demands involve integratingmul-
tiple locations across different temporal intervals to solve the task,
this would likely necessitate the hippocampus. Other situations
though, in which locations do not need to be integrated across
time yet still involve some relational processing between land-
marks, could rely more predominantly on other brain regions,
such as PHC and retrosplenial cortex. It is therefore reasonable
to speculate that the hippocampus is important for facilitating
an exchange of information between regions within a distributed
network that needs to be maintained over time intervals, rather
than representing spatial information about landmarks per se.
Indeed, recent findings demonstrating neurons that code for tem-
poral intervals in the hippocampus (Macdonald et al., 2011) as
well as the involvement of the hippocampus in spatiotemporal
binding (Copara et al., 2014), support this perspective. Impor-
tantly, the participation of the hippocampus in spatiotemporal
binding also suggests that the topological configuration of task
active networks dynamically reorganize their functional connec-
tions depending on the type of information needed to be recalled
from memory. Evidence for this is provided by Watrous et al.
(2013) who found that the strength of pairwise connections
between different brain regions in the PFC, MTL, and parietal
cortex changed depending on the spatial and temporal nature of
the task. In the case of allocentric representations, this model
would therefore predict that the degree of temporal interval in
which allocentric information needs to be integrated across would
correlate with the centrality of the hippocampus within a task
active network. Although we are not aware of any study inves-
tigating this, it is directly testable using spatiotemporal retrieval
tasks that manipulate the temporal interval over which spatial
information is acquired and use graph theoretical measures to
assess changes in node centrality. Another important test of this
prediction is that patients with damage to white matter tracts
connecting areas that functionally interact to produce allocen-
tric representation, such as those connecting hippocampus and
PFC, with no damage to hippocampus or PFC, should show
deficits in allocentric memory. This prediction also remains to
be tested.
Finally, despite the potential numerous advantages to a net-
work based model of allocentric representation, it is important
to highlight some of its current limitations. First and foremost is
how to properly delineate the operation of complex neurocogni-
tive functions such as allocentric representations if they are indeed
non-additive. As we have already articulated, we believe the sev-
eral studies argue against the idea that brain areas contribute
additively to allocentric representation. It is unclear, however,
how best to operationalize and quantify the precise mechanisms
in which an allocentric representation arises through non-linear
interactions. As argued by Bassett and Gazzaniga (2011), com-
plex network theory is perhaps best suited for this, although its
application to cognitive neuroscience data is relatively new and
the analytical techniques to decompose brain networks are devel-
oping at a rapid pace. Measures of signal entropy (Costa et al.,
2005; Garrett et al., 2013), complexity (Tononi et al., 1998; Deco
et al., 2013), dynamic functional connectivity (Zalesky et al., 2014),
and graph theory (Rubinov and Sporns, 2011) are promising new
approaches designed to capture the richly dynamic and context-
dependent basis of information processing in neural networks.
A second major limitation is identifying experimental tasks that
allow researchers to accurately identify the relative use of allocen-
tric and egocentric representations. As discussed above, despite
numerous decades of work, it remains difficult to precisely iden-
tify the contribution of each type of representation to a task,
suggesting that a better strategy may be to develop an allocen-
tric/egocentric index. Such work has recently been carried out by
Marchette et al. (2011) inwhich they quantified an individuals ten-
dency to utilize either an allocentric or egocentric representation.
Using a continuous variable to measure response strategy would
facilitate decomposing the dynamics of memory networks both
within and between subjects.
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FINAL NOTE: HIPPOCAMPAL PLACE CELLS AS AN EXAMPLE
OF MODULAR CODING OF THE ALLOCENTRIC
REPRESENTATION?
Thus far, we have focused on behavioral, lesion, and fMRI studies,
which argue against allocentric navigational strategies depending
on a single brain region (Figure 3A) and as decomposable into
contributions from individual brain regions (Figure 3B). One
might argue, as others have (O’Keefe and Nadel, 1978; Redish,
1999), however, that place cells, present in the rodent, mon-
key, and human hippocampus (O’Keefe and Dostrovsky, 1971;
Ekstrom et al., 2003; Hori et al., 2003), are the neural instanti-
ation of an allocentric representation, or cognitive map. While
place cells do have many features similar to what one might expect
in a neural systems that code spatial environments in a map-like
fashion, there are other important features of place cells that are
decidedly not map-like. Place cells in the rodent and human hip-
pocampus remap based on egocentric direction (Markus et al.,
1995; Miller et al., 2013), are sensitive to goal and other tempo-
ral variables (Gothard et al., 2001; Hollup et al., 2001; Ekstrom
et al., 2003; Bahar et al., 2011), and remap with subtle changes
to the spatial geometry of the environment (Leutgeb et al., 2005;
Wills et al., 2005). Indeed, recent theoretical models of the cogni-
tive map now suggest that time and geometry less variant spatial
coding mechanisms possibly resides outside of the hippocampus
(Buzsaki, 2006; Buzsaki and Moser, 2013). Grid cells, neurons
in enthorhinal cortex that fire in a regularly spaced fashion as
the rat explores a spatial environment (Fyhn et al., 2004; Jacobs
et al., 2013), may be a better candidate for the neural basis of
allocentric representation (Buzsaki and Moser, 2013). Yet lesions
of entorhinal cortex, at least in rodents, do not abolish place
cell firing in the CA3 subfield of the hippocampus (Lu et al.,
2013) and impair, but do not abolish, the place code in CA1
(Brun et al., 2008).Whilemany details of entorhinal–hippocampal
neural interactions remain to be established, grid cells do not
contribute in a clear or modular fashion to place coding in the
hippocampus, at least based on what the above-mentioned stud-
ies have determined so far in the rat. Furthermore, in addition
to grid cells, entorhinal cortex cells also respond to egocentric
direction (Sargolini et al., 2006), suggesting this area may not be
specialized for allocentric computations alone. In addition, con-
sistent with what we have argued here, it is clear that other areas,
like prefrontal and retrosplenial cortex, also contribute critically,
via oscillatory synchrony, to spatial coding in the hippocam-
pus (Benchenane et al., 2010; Battaglia et al., 2011; Fujisawa and
Buzsaki, 2011). Thus, although many aspects of the hippocampal
neural code would appear sufficient to support an allocentric rep-
resentation, the neural code itself is not map-like and depends, at
least in part, on coordinated input and activity from other brain
structures.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
We began our discussion by pointing out some of the difficulties
in pinning down the exact nature of the allocentric representation.
In many situations in which one might expect a “pure” allocentric
representation to predominate, such as reasoning about distances
on a map or using short-cuts while navigating, egocentric repre-
sentations bias howweutilize an allocentric representation. In fact,
while we identified situations in which an allocentric representa-
tion might dominate, such as when participants make judgments
involving relative distances or directions of objects to each other,
egocentric representations still serve as important anchors and
cues in solving these tasks. Even individuals may vary in the
degree to which they utilize a primarily egocentric or allocen-
tric strategy to solve a task, and even within individuals use of
these strategies may vary during a task. Our inability to identify
“process-pure” allocentric tasks suggested that it might also be
difficult to unambiguously identify situations in which lesions to
one brain region abolish allocentric memory. This appears to be
particularly true in humans, in which multiple brain appear nec-
essary for situations involving allocentric computations, including
PHC, retrosplenial cortex, PFC, and hippocampus. The lack of one
brain region as central to navigation involving allocentric compu-
tations suggested the possibility that this behavior might be better
described as a network phenomenon. We discussed two differ-
ent perspectives on this issue, both of which remain to be fully
tested. One view, the additive model, argues that an allocentric
representation emerges due to additive computations from indi-
vidual brain regions. Adifferent perspective, thatwe advocate here,
is that an allocentric representation emerges from non-additive
computations shared across multiple interacting brain regions.
We concluded with several predictions related to spatial mem-
ory tasks that provide critical tests of the non-additive network
model vs. the specialized perspective more frequently adopted in
the literature.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Arne D. Ekstrom is supported by the Sloan Foundation, Hell-
manYoung InvestigatorAward, andNIH/NINDS (R01NS076856).
Giuseppe Iaria is supported by the Natural Sciences and Engineer-
ing Research Council of Canada (RT735872).
REFERENCES
Aguirre, G. K., and D’Esposito, M. (1997). Environmental knowledge is subserved
by separable dorsal/ventral neural areas. J. Neurosci. 17, 2512–2518.
Aguirre, G. K., and D’Esposito,M. (1999). Topographical disorientation: a synthesis
and taxonomy. Brain 122(Pt 9), 1613–1628. doi: 10.1093/brain/122.9.1613
Aguirre, G. K., Detre, J. A., Alsop, D. C., and D’Esposito, M. (1996). The parahip-
pocampus subserves topographical learning in man. Cereb. Cortex 6, 823–829.
doi: 10.1093/cercor/6.6.823
Albert, R., Jeong, H., and Barabasi, A. L. (2000). Error and attack tolerance of
complex networks. Nature 406, 378–382. doi: 10.1038/35019019
Arnold, A. E., Protzner, A. B., Bray, S., Levy, R. M., and Iaria, G. (2014). Neural
network configuration and efficiency underlies individual differences in spa-
tial orientation ability. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 26, 380–394. doi: 10.1162/jocn_a_
00491
Astur, R. S., Taylor, L. B., Mamelak, A. N., Philpott, L., and Sutherland, R. J. (2002).
Humans with hippocampus damage display severe spatial memory impairments
in a virtual Morris water task. Behav. Brain Res. 132, 77–84. doi: 10.1016/S0166-
4328(01)00399-0
Auger, S. D., and Maguire, E. A. (2013). Assessing the mechanism of response in
the retrosplenial cortex of good and poor navigators. Cortex 49, 2904–2913. doi:
10.1016/j.cortex.2013.08.002
Azab, M., Stark, S. M., and Stark, C. E. (2014). Contributions of the human hip-
pocampal subfields to spatial and temporal pattern separation. Hippocampus 24,
293–302. doi: 10.1002/hipo.22223
Bahar, A. S., Shirvalkar, P. R., and Shapiro, M. L. (2011). Memory-guided
learning: CA1 and CA3 neuronal ensembles differentially encode the common-
alities and differences between situations. J. Neurosci. 31, 12270–12281. doi:
10.1523/JNEUROSCI.1671-11.2011
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org October 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 803 | 12
Ekstrom et al. A critical review of the allocentric representation
Banta-Lavenex, P., Colombo, F., Ribordy-Lambert, F., and Lavenex, P. (2014). The
human hippocampus beyond the cognitivemap: evidence from a densely amnesic
patient. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 8:711. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2014.00711
Barrash, J., Damasio, H., Adolphs, R., and Tranel, D. (2000). The neuroanatomi-
cal correlates of route learning impairment. Neuropsychologia 38, 820–836. doi:
10.1016/S0028-3932(99)00131-1
Bartsch, T., Schonfeld, R., Muller, F. J., Alfke, K., Leplow, B., Aldenhoff, J.,
et al. (2010). Focal lesions of human hippocampal CA1 neurons in tran-
sient global amnesia impair place memory. Science 328, 1412–1415. doi:
10.1126/science.1188160
Bassett, D. S., and Gazzaniga, M. S. (2011). Understanding complexity in
the human brain. Trends Cogn. Sci. 15, 200–209. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.
2011.03.006
Battaglia, F. P., Benchenane, K., Sirota, A., Pennartz, C. M., andWiener, S. I. (2011).
The hippocampus: hub of brain network communication for memory. Trends
Cogn. Sci. 15, 310–318. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2011.05.008
Benchenane, K., Peyrache, A., Khamassi, M., Tierney, P. L., Gioanni, Y., Battaglia, F.
P., et al. (2010). Coherent theta oscillations and reorganization of spike timing in
the hippocampal- prefrontal network upon learning. Neuron 66, 921–936. doi:
10.1016/j.neuron.2010.05.013
Bohbot, V. D., and Corkin, S. (2007). Posterior parahippocampal place learning in
H.M. Hippocampus 17, 863–872. doi: 10.1002/hipo.20313
Bohbot, V. D., Jech, R., Ruzicka, E., Nadel, L., Kalina, M., Stepankova, K., et al.
(2002). Rat spatialmemory tasks adapted for humans: characterization in subjects
with intact brain and subjects with selectivemedial temporal lobe thermal lesions.
Physiol. Res. 51(Suppl. 1), S49–S65.
Bohbot, V. D., Kalina, M., Stepankova, K., Spackova, N., Petrides, M., and Nadel, L.
(1998). Spatial memory deficits in patients with lesions to the right hippocampus
and to the right parahippocampal cortex. Neuropsychologia 36, 1217–1238. doi:
10.1016/S0028-3932(97)00161-9
Brun, V. H., Leutgeb, S., Wu, H. Q., Schwarcz, R., Witter, M. P., Moser, E. I., et al.
(2008). Impaired spatial representation in CA1 after lesion of direct input from
entorhinal cortex. Neuron 57, 290–302. doi: 10.1016/j.neuron.2007.11.034
Bullmore, E., and Sporns, O. (2009). Complex brain networks: graph theoretical
analysis of structural and functional systems. Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 10, 186–198.
doi: 10.1038/nrn2575
Burgess,N. (2006). Spatialmemory: howegocentric and allocentric combine.Trends
Cogn. Sci. 10, 551–557. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2006.10.005
Burgess, N., Maguire, E. A., and O’Keefe, J. (2002). The human hippocampus
and spatial and episodic memory. Neuron 35, 625–641. doi: 10.1016/S0896-
6273(02)00830-9
Burgess, N., Maguire, E. A., Spiers, H. J., and O’Keefe, J. (2001). A temporopari-
etal and prefrontal network for retrieving the spatial context of lifelike events.
Neuroimage 14, 439–453. doi: 10.1006/nimg.2001.0806
Buzsaki, G. (2006). Rhythms of the Brain. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Buzsaki, G., and Moser, E. I. (2013). Memory, navigation and theta rhythm
in the hippocampal-entorhinal system. Nat. Neurosci. 16, 130–138. doi:
10.1038/nn.3304
Byrne, P., Becker, S., and Burgess, N. (2007). Remembering the past and imagining
the future: a neural model of spatial memory and imagery. Psychol. Rev. 114,
340–375. doi: 10.1037/0033-295X.114.2.340
Caglio, M., Latini-Corazzini, L., D’Agata, F., Cauda, F., Sacco, K., Monteverdi,
S., et al. (2012). Virtual navigation for memory rehabilitation in a traumatic
brain injured patient. Neurocase 18, 123–131. doi: 10.1080/13554794.2011.
568499
Cheng, K., and Newcombe, N. S. (2005). Is there a geometric module for spatial
orientation? Squaring theory and evidence. Psychon. Bull. Rev. 12, 1–23. doi:
10.3758/BF03196346
Chrastil, E. R. (2012). Neural evidence supports a novel framework for spatial
navigation. Psychon. Bull. Rev. 20, 208–227. doi: 10.3758/s13423-012-0351-6
Committeri, G., Galati, G., Paradis, A. L., Pizzamiglio, L., Berthoz, A., and LeBihan,
D. (2004). Reference frames for spatial cognition: different brain areas are involved
in viewer-, object-, and landmark-centered judgments about object location.
J. Cogn. Neurosci. 16, 1517–1535. doi: 10.1162/0898929042568550
Copara, M. S., Hassan, A. S., Kyle, C. T., Libby, L. A., Ranganath, C., and
Ekstrom, A. D. (2014). Complementary roles of human hippocampal subre-
gions during retrieval of spatiotemporal context. J. Neurosci. 34, 6834–6842. doi:
10.1523/JNEUROSCI.5341-13.2014
Costa, M., Goldberger, A. L., and Peng, C. K. (2005). Multiscale entropy analysis
of biological signals. Phys. Rev. E Stat. Nonlin. Soft Matter Phys. 71, 021906. doi:
10.1103/PhysRevE.71.021906
D’Hooge, R., and De Deyn, P. P. (2001). Applications of the Morris water maze
in the study of learning and memory. Brain Res. Brain Res. Rev. 36, 60–90. doi:
10.1016/S0165-0173(01)00067-4
Day, L. B.,Weisand,M., Sutherland, R. J., and Schallert, T. (1999). The hippocampus
is not necessary for a place response but may be necessary for pliancy. Behav.
Neurosci. 113, 914–924. doi: 10.1037/0735-7044.113.5.914
Deco, G., Jirsa, V. K., and McIntosh, A. R. (2013). Resting brains never rest: com-
putational insights into potential cognitive architectures. Trends Neurosci. 36,
268–274. doi: 10.1016/j.tins.2013.03.001
Diana, R. A., Yonelinas, A. P., and Ranganath, C. (2008). The effects of unitiza-
tion on familiarity-based source memory: testing a behavioral prediction derived
from neuroimaging data. J. Exp. Psychol. Learn. Mem. Cogn. 34, 730–740. doi:
10.1037/0278-7393.34.4.730
Diwadkar, V. A., and McNamara, T. P. (1997). Viewpoint dependence in
scene recognition. Psychol. Sci. 8, 302–307. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9280.1997.
tb00442.x
Ekstrom, A. D. (2010). How and when the fMRI BOLD signal relates to underlying
neural activity: the danger in dissociation. Brain Res. Rev. 62, 233–244. doi:
10.1016/j.brainresrev.2009.12.004
Ekstrom, A. D., Kahana, M. J., Caplan, J. B., Fields, T. A., Isham, E. A., Newman, E.
L., et al. (2003). Cellular networks underlying human spatial navigation. Nature
425, 184–188. doi: 10.1038/nature01964
Epstein, R., Graham, K. S., and Downing, P. E. (2003). Viewpoint-specific scene
representations in human parahippocampal cortex. Neuron 37, 865–876. doi:
10.1016/S0896-6273(03)00117-X
Epstein, R., and Kanwisher, N. (1998). A cortical representation of the local visual
environment. Nature 392, 598–601. doi: 10.1038/33402
Epstein, R. A., and Higgins, J. S. (2007). Differential parahippocampal and retros-
plenial involvement in three types of visual scene recognition. Cereb. Cortex 17,
1680–1693. doi: 10.1093/cercor/bhl079
Epstein, R. A., Parker,W. E., and Feiler, A.M. (2007).Where am I now? Distinct roles
for parahippocampal and retrosplenial cortices in place recognition. J. Neurosci.
27, 6141–6149. doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.0799-07.2007
Evans, G. W., and Pezdek, K. (1980). Cognitive mapping: knowledge of real-world
distance and location information. J. Exp. Psychol. Hum. Learn. 6, 13–24. doi:
10.1037/0278-7393.6.1.13
Fodor, J. (1983). The Modularity of the Mind. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Foo, P., Warren, W. H., Duchon, A., and Tarr, M. J. (2005). Do humans inte-
grate routes into a cognitive map? Map- versus landmark-based navigation of
novel shortcuts. J. Exp. Psychol. Learn. 31, 195–215. doi: 10.1037/0278-7393.
31.2.195
Frankenstein, J., Mohler, B. J., Bulthoff, H. H., and Meilinger, T. (2012).
Is the map in our head oriented north? Psychol. Sci. 23, 120–125. doi:
10.1177/0956797611429467
Fried, I. (1998). The hippocampus and human navigation: technical comment.
Science 282:2151. doi: 10.1126/science.282.5397.2151a
Friston, K. J., and Price, C. J. (2011). Modules and brain mapping. Cogn.
Neuropsychol. 28, 241–250. doi: 10.1080/02643294.2011.558835
Friston, K. J., Price, C. J., Fletcher, P., Moore, C., Frackowiak, R. S., and Dolan,
R. J. (1996). The trouble with cognitive subtraction. Neuroimage 4, 97–104. doi:
10.1006/nimg.1996.0033
Fujisawa, S., and Buzsaki, G. (2011). A 4 Hz oscillation adaptively synchro-
nizes prefrontal, VTA, and hippocampal activities. Neuron 72, 153–165. doi:
10.1016/j.neuron.2011.08.018
Fyhn, M., Molden, S., Witter, M. P., Moser, E. I., and Moser, M. B. (2004).
Spatial representation in the entorhinal cortex. Science 305, 1258–1264. doi:
10.1126/science.1099901
Galati, G., Pelle, G., Berthoz, A., and Committeri, G. (2010). Multiple reference
frames used by the human brain for spatial perception and memory. Exp. Brain
Res. 206, 109–120. doi: 10.1007/s00221-010-2168-8
Gallistel, C. R. (1990). The Organization of Learning. Cambridge: MT Press.
Garrett, D. D., Samanez-Larkin, G. R., MacDonald, S. W., Lindenberger, U., McIn-
tosh, A. R., and Grady, C. L. (2013). Moment-to-moment brain signal variability:
a next frontier in human brain mapping? Neurosci. Biobehav. Rev. 37, 610–624.
doi: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2013.02.015
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org October 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 803 | 13
Ekstrom et al. A critical review of the allocentric representation
Goodrich-Hunsaker, N. J., Livingstone, S. A., Skelton, R. W., and Hopkins, R.
O. (2010). Spatial deficits in a virtual water maze in amnesic participants with
hippocampal damage. Hippocampus 20, 481–491. doi: 10.1002/hipo.20651
Gothard, K. M., Hoffman, K. L., Battaglia, F. P., and McNaughton, B. L. (2001).
Dentate gyrus and CA1 ensemble activity during spatial reference frame shifts in
the presence and absence of visual input. J. Neurosci. 21, 7284–7292.
Habib, M., and Sirigu, A. (1987). Pure topographical disorientation: a definition
and anatomical basis. Cortex 23, 73–85. doi: 10.1016/S0010-9452(87)80020-5
Hollup, S. A., Molden, S., Donnett, J. G., Moser, M. B., and Moser, E. I. (2001).
Accumulation of hippocampal place fields at the goal location in an annular
watermaze task. J. Neurosci. 21, 1635–1644.
Holmes, M. C., and Sholl, M. J. (2005). Allocentric coding of object-to-object
relations in overlearned and novel environments. J. Exp. Psychol. Learn. Mem.
Cogn. 31, 1069–1087. doi: 10.1037/0278-7393.31.5.1069
Hori, E., Tabuchi, E., Matsumura, N., Tamura, R., Eifuku, S., Endo, S., et al. (2003).
Representation of place by monkey hippocampal neurons in real and virtual
translocation. Hippocampus 13, 190–196. doi: 10.1002/hipo.10062
Iaria, G., Arnold, A. E., Burles, F., Liu, I., Slone, E., Barclay, S., et al. (2014). Devel-
opmental topographical disorientation and decreased hippocampal functional
connectivity. Hippocampus doi: 10.1002/hipo.22317 [Epub ahead of print].
Iaria, G., and Barton, J. J. (2010). Developmental topographical disorientation:
a newly discovered cognitive disorder. Exp. Brain Res. 206, 189–196. doi:
10.1007/s00221-010-2256-9
Iaria, G., Bogod, N., Fox, C. J., and Barton, J. J. (2009). Developmen-
tal topographical disorientation: case one. Neuropsychologia 47, 30–40. doi:
10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2008.08.021
Iaria, G., Chen, J. K., Guariglia, C., Ptito, A., and Petrides, M. (2007). Retrosplenial
and hippocampal brain regions in human navigation: complementary functional
contributions to the formation and use of cognitive maps. Eur. J. Neurosci. 25,
890–899. doi: 10.1111/j.1460-9568.2007.05371.x
Ishikawa, T., and Montello, D. R. (2006). Spatial knowledge acquisition from direct
experience in the environment: individual differences in the development of
metric knowledge and the integration of separately learned places. Cogn. Psychol.
52, 93–129. doi: 10.1016/j.cogpsych.2005.08.003
Jacobs, J., Weidemann, C. T., Miller, J. F., Solway, A., Burke, J. F., Wei, X. X.,
et al. (2013). Direct recordings of grid-like neuronal activity in human spatial
navigation. Nat. Neurosci. 16, 1188–1190. doi: 10.1038/nn.3466
Janzen, G., and van Turennout,M. (2004). Selective neural representation of objects
relevant for navigation. Nat. Neurosci. 7, 673–677. doi: 10.1038/nn1257
Lavenex, P., and Amaral, D. G. (2000). Hippocampal-neocortical interaction:
a hierarchy of associativity. Hippocampus 10, 420–430. doi: 10.1002/1098-
1063(2000)10:4<420::AID-HIPO8>3.0.CO;2-5
Leutgeb, J. K., Leutgeb, S., Treves, A., Meyer, R., Barnes, C. A., McNaughton,
B. L., et al. (2005). Progressive transformation of hippocampal neuronal
representations in “morphed” environments. Neuron 48, 345–358. doi:
10.1016/j.neuron.2005.09.007
Liang, J. C., Wagner, A. D., and Preston, A. R. (2013). Content represen-
tation in the human medial temporal lobe. Cereb. Cortex 23, 80–96. doi:
10.1093/cercor/bhr379
Loomis, J. M., Klatzky, R. L., Golledge, R. G., Cicinelli, J. G., Pellegrino, J. W.,
and Fry, P. A. (1993). Nonvisual navigation by blind and sighted: assessment
of path integration ability. J. Exp. Psychol. Gen. 122, 73–91. doi: 10.1037/0096-
3445.122.1.73
Lu, L., Leutgeb, J. K., Tsao, A., Henriksen, E. J., Leutgeb, S., Barnes, C. A., et al.
(2013). Impaired hippocampal rate coding after lesions of the lateral entorhinal
cortex. Nat. Neurosci. 16, 1085–1093. doi: 10.1038/nn.3462
Macdonald,C. J., Lepage,K.Q., Eden,U.T., andEichenbaum,H. (2011). Hippocam-
pal “time cells” bridge the gap in memory for discontiguous events. Neuron 71,
737–749. doi: 10.1016/j.neuron.2011.07.012
Marchette, S. A., Bakker, A., and Shelton, A. L. (2011). Cognitive mappers to
creatures of habit: differential engagement of place and response learning mech-
anisms predicts human navigational behavior. J. Neurosci. 31, 15264–15268. doi:
10.1523/JNEUROSCI.3634-11.2011
Markus, E. J., Qin, Y. L., Leonard, B., Skaggs, W. E., McNaughton, B. L., and
Barnes, C. A. (1995). Interactions between location and task affect the spatial and
directional firing of hippocampal neurons. J. Neurosci. 15, 7079–7094.
McNamara, T. P., Rump, B., andWerner, S. (2003). Egocentric and geocentric frames
of reference in memory of large-scale space. Psychon. Bull. Rev. 10, 589–595. doi:
10.3758/BF03196519
McNaughton, B. L., Chen, L. L., and Markus, E. J. (1991). “Dead reckoning,”
landmark learning, and the sense of direction: a neurophysiological and computa-
tional hypothesis. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 3, 190–205. doi: 10.1162/jocn.1991.3.2.190
Miller, J. F., Neufang, M., Solway, A., Brandt, A., Trippel, M., Mader, I., et al. (2013).
Neural activity in human hippocampal formation reveals the spatial context of
retrieved memories. Science 342, 1111–1114. doi: 10.1126/science.1244056
Mittelstaedt, M. L., and Mittelstaedt, M. L. (1980). Homing by path integration in a
mammal. Naturewissenschaften 67, 566–567. doi: 10.1007/BF00450672
Morris, R. G. M., Garrud, P., Rawlins, J. N. P., and O’Keefe, J. (1982). Place nav-
igation impaired in rats with hippocampal lesions. Nature 297, 681–683. doi:
10.1038/297681a0
Moscovitch, M., Nadel, L., Winocur, G., Gilboa, A., and Rosenbaum, R. S. (2006).
The cognitive neuroscience of remote episodic, semantic and spatial memory.
Curr. Opin. Neurobiol. 16, 179–190. doi: 10.1016/j.conb.2006.03.013
Moscovitch, M., Rosenbaum, R. S., Gilboa, A., Addis, D. R., Westmacott, R., Grady,
C., et al. (2005). Functional neuroanatomy of remote episodic, semantic and
spatial memory: a unified account based on multiple trace theory. J. Anat. 207,
35–66. doi: 10.1111/j.1469-7580.2005.00421.x
Mou,W., McNamara, T. P., Valiquette, C. M., and Rump, B. (2004). Allocentric and
egocentric updating of spatial memories. J. Exp. Psychol. Learn. Mem. Cogn. 30,
142–157. doi: 10.1037/0278-7393.30.1.142
Nadel, L. (1991). The hippocampus and space revisited. Hippocampus 1, 221–229.
doi: 10.1002/hipo.450010302
O’Keefe, J., and Dostrovsky, J. (1971). The hippocampus as a spatial map. Prelimi-
nary evidence from unit activity in the freely-moving rat. Brain Res. 34, 171–175.
doi: 10.1016/0006-8993(71)90358-1
O’Keefe, J., and Nadel, L. (1978). The Hippocampus as a Cognitive Map. Oxford:
Clarendon Press.
Pearce, J. M., Roberts, A. D., and Good, M. (1998). Hippocampal lesions disrupt
navigation based on cognitive maps but not heading vectors. Nature 396, 75–77.
doi: 10.1038/23941
Philbeck, J. W., Klatzky, R. L., Behrmann, M., Loomis, J. M., and Goodridge,
J. (2001). Active control of locomotion facilitates nonvisual navigation. J. Exp.
Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 27, 141–153. doi: 10.1037/0096-1523.27.1.141
Philbeck, J. W., Loomis, J. M., and Beall, A. C. (1997). Visually perceived location
is an invariant in the control of action. Percept. Psychophys. 59, 601–612. doi:
10.3758/BF03211868
Poucet, B. (1993). Spatial cognitive maps in animals: new hypotheses on their
structure and neural mechanisms. Psychol. Rev. 100, 163–182. doi: 10.1037/0033-
295X.100.2.163
Protzner, A. B., and McAndrews, M. P. (2011). Network alterations supporting
word retrieval in patients with medial temporal lobe epilepsy. J. Cogn. Neurosci.
23, 2605–2619. doi: 10.1162/jocn.2010.21599
Redish, A. D. (1999). Beyond the Cognitive Map. Boston: MIT Press.
Richardson, A. E., Montello, D. R., and Hegarty, M. (1999). Spatial knowledge
acquisition from maps and from navigation in real and virtual environments.
Mem. Cogn. 27, 741–750. doi: 10.3758/BF03211566
Rosenbaum, R. S., Priselac, S., Kohler, S., Black, S. E., Gao, F., Nadel, L., et al.
(2000). Remote spatial memory in an amnesic person with extensive bilateral
hippocampal lesions. Nat. Neurosci. 3, 1044–1048. doi: 10.1038/79867
Rosenbaum, R. S., Ziegler, M., Winocur, G., Grady, C. L., and Moscovitch, M.
(2004). “I have often walked down this street before”: fMRI studies on the hip-
pocampus and other structures during mental navigation of an old environment.
Hippocampus 14, 826–835. doi: 10.1002/hipo.10218
Roskos-Ewoldsen, B., McNamara, T. P., Shelton, A. L., and Carr, W. (1998). Mental
representations of large and small spatial layouts are orientation dependent. J.
Exp. Psychol. Learn. Mem. Cogn. 24, 215–226. doi: 10.1037/0278-7393.24.1.215
Rubinov, M., and Sporns, O. (2011). Weight-conserving characterization
of complex functional brain networks. Neuroimage 56, 2068–2079. doi:
10.1016/j.neuroimage.2011.03.069
Sargolini, F., Fyhn, M., Hafting, T., McNaughton, B. L., Witter, M. P., Moser, M. B.,
et al. (2006). Conjunctive representation of position, direction, and velocity in
entorhinal cortex. Science 312, 758–762. doi: 10.1126/science.1125572
Schedlbauer, A. M., Copara, M. S., Watrous, A. J., and Ekstrom, A. D. (2014). Mul-
tiple interacting brain areas underlie successful spatiotemporal memory retrieval
in humans. Sci. Rep. 4:6431. doi: 10.1038/srep06431
Shelton, A. L., and McNamara, T. (2001). Systems of spatial reference in human
memory. Cogn. Psychol. 43, 274–310. doi: 10.1006/cogp.2001.0758
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org October 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 803 | 14
Ekstrom et al. A critical review of the allocentric representation
Sheth, B. R., and Shimojo, S. (2004). Extrinsic cues suppress the encoding of intrinsic
cues. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 16, 339–350. doi: 10.1162/089892904322984616
Sholl, M. J. (1987). Cognitive maps as orienting schemata. J. Exp. Psychol. Learn.
Mem. Cogn. 13, 615–628. doi: 10.1037/0278-7393.13.4.615
Siegel, A. W., and White, S. H. (1975). “The development of spatial representations
of large-scale environments,” in Advances in Child Development and Behavior, ed.
H. W. Reese (New York, NY: Academic Press).
Simons, D. J., and Wang, R. F. (1998). Perceiving real-world viewpoint changes.
Psychol. Sci. 9, 315–320. doi: 10.1111/1467-9280.00062
Souman, J. L., Frissen, I., Sreenivasa, M. N., and Ernst, M. O. (2009). Walking
straight into circles. Curr. Biol. 19, 1538–1542. doi: 10.1016/j.cub.2009.07.053
Spiers, H. J., and Maguire, E. A. (2006). Thoughts, behaviour, and brain dynam-
ics during navigation in the real world. Neuroimage 31, 1826–1840. doi:
10.1016/j.neuroimage.2006.01.037
Sporns, O., Chialvo, D. R., Kaiser, M., and Hilgetag, C. C. (2004). Organization,
development and function of complex brain networks. Trends Cogn. Sci. 8, 418–
425. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2004.07.008
Stevens, A., and Coupe, P. (1978). Distortions in judged spatial relations. Cogn.
Psychol. 10, 422–437. doi: 10.1016/0010-0285(78)90006-3
Sulpizio, V., Committeri, G., and Galati, G. (2014). Distributed cognitive maps
reflecting real distances between places and views in the human brain. Front.
Hum. Neurosci. 8:716. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2014.00716
Takahashi, N., Kawamura, M., Shiota, J., Kasahata, N., and Hirayama, K. (1997).
Pure topographic disorientation due to right retrosplenial lesion. Neurology 49,
464–469. doi: 10.1212/WNL.49.2.464
Teng, E., and Squire, L. R. (1999). Memory for places learned long ago is intact after
hippocampal damage. Nature 400, 675–677. doi: 10.1038/23276
Tolman, E. C. (1948). Cognitive maps in rats and men. Psychol. Rev. 55, 189–208.
doi: 10.1037/h0061626
Tononi, G., Edelman, G. M., and Sporns, O. (1998). Complexity and coherency:
integrating information in the brain. Trends Cogn. Sci. 2, 474–484. doi:
10.1016/S1364-6613(98)01259-5
Tononi, G., Sporns, O., and Edelman, G. M. (1999). Measures of degeneracy and
redundancy in biological networks. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 96, 3257–3262.
doi: 10.1073/pnas.96.6.3257
Tversky, B. (1992). Distortions in cognitive maps. Geoforum 2, 131–138. doi:
10.1016/0016-7185(92)90011-R
Waller, D., and Hodgson, E. (2006). Transient and enduring spatial representations
under disorientation and self-rotation. J. Exp. Psychol. Learn. Mem. Cogn. 32,
867–882. doi: 10.1037/0278-7393.32.4.867
Wang, R., and Spelke, E. (2002). Human spatial representation: insights from
animals. Trends Cogn. Sci. 6:376. doi: 10.1016/S1364-6613(02)01961-7
Wang, R. F., and Spelke, E. S. (2000). Updating egocentric representations in human
navigation. Cognition 77, 215–250. doi: 10.1016/S0010-0277(00)00105-0
Watrous, A. J., Tandon, N., Conner, C. R., Pieters, T., and Ekstrom, A. D. (2013).
Frequency-specific network connectivity increases underlie accurate spatiotem-
poral memory retrieval. Nat. Neurosci. 16, 349–356. doi: 10.1038/nn.3315
Weniger, G., Siemerkus, J., Schmidt-Samoa, C., Mehlitz, M., Baudewig, J., Dechent,
P., et al. (2010). The human parahippocampal cortex subserves egocentric spatial
learning during navigation in a virtual maze. Neurobiol. Learn. Mem. 93, 46–55.
doi: 10.1016/j.nlm.2009.08.003
Werner, S., and Schmidt, K. E. (1999). Environmental reference systems for large-
scale spaces. Spat. Cogn. Comput. 1, 447–473. doi: 10.1023/A:1010095831166
Wills, T. J., Lever, C., Cacucci, F., Burgess, N., and O’Keefe, J. (2005). Attractor
dynamics in the hippocampal representation of the local environment. Science
308, 873–876. doi: 10.1126/science.1108905
Winocur, G., Moscovitch, M., Fogel, S., Rosenbaum, R. S., and Sekeres, M.
(2005). Preserved spatial memory after hippocampal lesions: effects of exten-
sive experience in a complex environment. Nat. Neurosci. 8, 273–275. doi:
10.1038/nn1401
Winocur, G., Moscovitch, M., Rosenbaum, R. S., and Sekeres, M. (2010). An
investigation of the effects of hippocampal lesions in rats on pre- and postop-
eratively acquired spatial memory in a complex environment. Hippocampus 20,
1350–1365. doi: 10.1002/hipo.20721
Wolbers, T., and Buchel, C. (2005). Dissociable retrosplenial and hippocampal
contributions to successful formation of survey representations. J. Neurosci. 25,
3333–3340. doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.4705-04.2005
Wolbers, T., and Wiener, J. M. (2014). Challenges in identifying the neural mech-
anisms that support spatial navigation: the impact of spatial scale. Front. Hum.
Neurosci. 8:571. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2014.00571
Yamamoto, N., and Shelton, A. L. (2009). Sequential versus simultaneous view-
ing of an environment: effects of focal attention to individual object locations
on visual spatial learning. Vis. Cogn. 17, 457–483. doi: 10.1080/13506280701
653644
Yassa, M. A., and Stark, C. E. (2009). A quantitative evaluation of cross-participant
registration techniques for MRI studies of the medial temporal lobe. Neuroimage
44, 319–327. doi: 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2008.09.016
Zalesky, A., Fornito, A., Cocchi, L., Gollo, L. L., and Breakspear, M. (2014). Time-
resolved resting-state brain networks. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 111, 10341–
10346. doi: 10.1073/pnas.1400181111
Zhang, H., Copara, M. S., and Ekstrom, A. D. (2012). Differential recruitment
of brain networks following route and cartographic map learning of spatial
environments. PLoS ONE 7:e44886. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0044886
Zhang, H., and Ekstrom, A. D. (2013). Human neural systems underlying rigid
and flexible forms of allocentric spatial representation. Hum. Brain Mapp. 34,
1070–1087. doi: 10.1002/hbm.21494
Zhang,H., Zherdeva, K., and Ekstrom,A. D. (2014). Different“routes” to a cognitive
map: dissociable forms of spatial knowledge derived from route and cartographic
map learning. Mem Cogn. 42, 1106–1117. doi: 10.3758/s13421-014-0418-x
Conflict of Interest Statement:The authors declare that the researchwas conducted
in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed
as a potential conflict of interest.
Received: 13 August 2014; paper pending published: 09 September 2014; accepted: 21
September 2014; published online: 10 October 2014.
Citation: Ekstrom AD, Arnold AEGF and Iaria G (2014) A critical review of the allo-
centric spatial representation and its neural underpinnings: toward a network-based
perspective. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 8:803. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2014.00803
This article was submitted to the journal Frontiers in Human Neuroscience.
Copyright © 2014 Ekstrom, Arnold and Iaria. This is an open-access article distributed
under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, dis-
tribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s)
or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in
accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is
permitted which does not comply with these terms.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org October 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 803 | 15
